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RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN YUGOSLAVIA 
by Stella. ·Alexander 
Stella Alexander is a member of the London 
Yearly' Meeting of the· Religious Society of 
Friends (Quakers) ·and )'laS for a number of 
years secretary of their East-West·Relations 
Committee. She has been studying cl:J.urc:h..: 
state relations in . Yugoslavia _sin~e the 
middle 1960s and is the author of Church and 
State in ·Yugoslavia since +945 (Cambridg~ 
University Pres~, 1979). She is currently a 
member of· the East-West Relations Advisory · 
Committee of the Bristish Council of Churches 
and a member . of the Keston College Council 
of Management and the Editorlal Board of its·· 
publication Religion in Communist·Lands .. She 
has written a number of articles and 
conference papers on her subject. The 
article originally appeared in Studies in. 
Church. History, Vol. 18, pp. 591-607. 
Reprinted by permission. of Basil Blackwell, 
dxford, for the Ecclesia~tical . History 
·Society, with minor editorial changes. 
R,eligl'on in· Yugoslavia. is a divisive, not a unifying force. The 
country is · a federation of republics inhabited · by .si.l;( differE=mt 
nationalities which are historically identified with three great 
religious confessions--Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam. The pattern _is 
complex and dense, the assumptions and ref.tex actions of. the human 
beings who make up· these communities are d~eply· rooted in centuries of 
history, and nationalism and religion are proving tougher than ideology. 
The Slovenes · and Croats in· the western part of the country are 
Catholics, the Serbs, Montenegrins and Mc:tcedonians in the eastern half 
are Orthodox;" they live on either side of the historic line which 
divides the Wes'tern from the Eastern Church,. Latin Christianity from 
Eastern Orthodoxy, the Habsburg·s: from the Ottoman Turks. Lying as bride 
.. 
the· line, at the.. core · of modern Yugoslavia , is .. Bosnia.-Hercegovina, 
inhabited ·by a mixture of Orthodox Serbs, . Ciitholic .Cro~~s ·an_d. Slav 
. . 
Moslems, descendants of converts to J;slam under. the.Turkish.occupation. 
Some of'these.Moslems considered'themselves. Serb? and some Croats (not 
infrequently'·· members of the same family) but. they for~ .. a distinct 
cultural group and, for reason~ which will be examined later, they have 
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been recognised since 1968 as a separate, sixth nationality. 
These are the 'priricip~l· .broad divisions; but the situation is 
further complicated by the·. numerous minorities within Yugoslavia--
Hungarians, Slovaks and Romanians·· ·in · the north, Albanians, Turks and 
Vlachs in the' south and ·Gypsies .everywhere (with their own lang_uage now 
officially recognis~d) .. Albanians a~~· ~ostly Moslem by cultur~, . if not 
today by religion, but they call themselves Alba,nian, not Moslems, and 
the same is true of the TUrks. Furthermbre the majority nationalities 
appear as minorities within other republics; there is an important group 
of Serbs living wftl)in Croatia, who suffered greatly under the war-time 
fascist Ustaif~ state, and who today constitute an irritant factor in 
Croatia with its simmering nationalism; and there are also small groups 
...__ . 
of Croats living in various parts of Serb1a. 
Religion. played an important part 'in the formati6n of the Serbian 
and Croatian nations,. and became closely identified in each case with 
the concept of. nationhood; its effect on the formation of· the recently 
established Moslem nation has worked rather differently. 
I propose firstly to examine, nation. by nation, how this happened 
·in history~· ana secondly ·its effects. on the state of Y_ugoslavia, and, 
. .,., . 
since' the war, on ~n ideologically secular regime. 
I 
Ser:Oia 
A few years ago a Serbian Orthodox .priest living i.n London told me 
• 
that he would have to have very compelling reasons . indee\d before he 
woulq baptise a non-Serb into the Serbian Orthodox Churc.h. This total 
identification of the· :church with the nation .is rooted in its history, 
its culture and its whole way of life. 
The Slavs in the south-eastern part of the Balkan peninsula became 
Christian under the Eastern Church in the ninth century and _adopted the 
Cyrillic alphabet;- this was to prove an important factor in separating 
them from the western south Slavs,·who used the Latin alphabet. From the 
twelfth to the thirteenth centuries Serbia developed into a powerful 
state under the Nemanj·a dynasty, which used the church to consolidate 
its· power. One of them, the young~st son of stefan Nemanja, secured the 
·a.utocephaly ·of the· Serbian ·Orthodox Church and established a national 
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ecclesiastical administration for Serb.ia. As St. Sava, he became the 
principal cult-figure of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Nemanjids were 
great builders of churches and monasterie$, many of which survive, and 
are monuments to their faith and their. high.artistic achievement. 
The Ottomans advanced_up the Balkan peninsula during the-fourteenth 
century, and in 1389 met and conquered the Serbian army and its allies 
at Kosovo, the Field of the.Blackbirds, an event which became on~ -of the 
central myths of Serbian history and inspired a gre.at cycle of epic 
poems. 
Under the Ottomans, who divided their conquered subjects according 
to their religion and. granted considerable.local autonomy, the Serbiau 
Orthodox Church took over the functions of · government, with its own 
administrations and law courts; priests became the mediators and the 
go-betweens between rulers and ruled. 
Modern Serbian nationalism was stimulat~d by the decline. of the 
Ottoman empire, and at the same time the wars between Turkey and Austria 
sharpened the conflict between the Catholic Croats in the north and the 
Orthodox Serbs in the south, as each of the major combatants used them 
as pawns in .their larger power game. The Catholic Church accompanied the 
Austrian advances and proselytised vigorously among the Orthodox, laying 
the foundations for the rooted distrust of the Catholic Church which 
still underlies Serbian Orthodox attitudes. But the Habsburgs also 
invited groups of Serbs to settle on and defend the military frontier 
between Turkey and Austria, promising them religious freedom and their 
own church structure. It was in this period that a great migration of 
Serbs from the heartland of Old Serbia took place, led by patriarch 
Arsenije III; they settled north of the Danube at the invitation of 
Emperor Leopold I. The territory vacated by the Serbs gradually filled 
with Albanian Moslems; this alienation of the land which gave birth to 
the Serbian legend is a continuing source of grief and bitterness to ·the 
Serbs. 
The eight.eenth. century saw further religious _pressures. on the 
Serbs, from the Austrians who established .a Uniate Church (Greek 
Catholic) . in areas under their control, and from the Greek officials of 
the Ottoman empire, the so-called Phanariots, who combined with the 
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hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church in an attempt to Hellenise the 
other Orthodox churches. They secu·red the abolition of the Serbian 
partriarchate of Pee in ·1766, deposed Serbian bishops and clergy and 
replaced the old Slav liturgies with the Greek rite. Although the .Serb? 
succeeded in expelling the Phanariots less than fifty years later, the 
experie·nce left a scar. 
One effect of these centuries of outside pressures has been to make 
the Serbian Orthodox Church deeply conservative and backward-looking, 
feeding on it~ past; this, combined with its status, after the sixteenth 
century, as part of the machinery of Ottoman government and thus in some 
senses a part of the ruling establishment, made it inevitably resistant 
to change. It opposed with obdu~acy, for example, the reforms introduced 
into Serbian national life by two remarkable men, Dositej Obradovic in 
the eighteenth century, who laid the foundation of modern literary 
Serbian, and Vuk Karad~ic in the nineteenth century, who reformed the 
grammar and orthography of the Serbian language. Together the two men 
broke the exclusive hold of the Orthodox' Church over the s'erbian mind 
and introduced concepts of rationalism and secular nationalism. But at 
. ·~ . 
the same time many priests identified themselves with the Serbian 
national struggle for freedom from the Turks during the latter part of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they fought with and sometimes 
·even led the ·bands of half-revolutionaries, half-outlaws who harassed 
the weakening and retreating Ottoman forces. All this reinforced the 
church's concept of itself as the guardian and protector of Serbian 
nationhood, and did in fact help to create a Serbian national identity. 
It .was however Ottoman religious toleration which made this attitude 
possible, whereas when the last war brought about a confrontation with 
Croatian Catholics, there was no toleration, only a savage mu·tual lust 
to destroy. 
Montenegro 
Montenegro was part of the medieval kingdom of Serbia. until the 
fOUrteenth Century 1 When it broke away: they Still COnSid.er themselVeS 
closer to the Serbs than to any other south Slav nation. It is a srriall, 
mountainous, inhospitable land which during its long struggle against 
the 'Turks became fiercely tribal and vengeful; it was the price the 
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Montenegrins. ,paid for .. their successful resistance. In ·the sixteenth 
century the bishops of C~tinje, the capital, assumed political·power and 
took over -the. rule: .of the country and at· th~ end of the seventeenth 
century this becam:e hereditary.,· usually passing from uncle to nephew· .. 
Ecc;:lesi~stical and temporal. ·authority became completely merged. This 
curious . arrangement lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century 
and gave continuiuty and stability to.the state. 
Macedonia 
The geographical area known as Macedonia lies between Greece, 
Bulgaria and. Serbia, all of which have claimed the area; it is 
economically and strategically important.because of the port of Salonika 
and the fertile surrounding plains, and because the valley of the Vardar 
is a strategic corridor to central Europe. The inhabitants of the 
terri tory are partly Slav, that is Serbs and Bulgarians, and partly a 
mixture of Albani.an and Turkish Moslems, Orthodox Greek and Vlachs; the 
Slav dialects of the region can be understood by both Serbs and 
Bulgarians and both have claimed the Slav inhabitants as part of their 
respective nations. It has, in fact, al•l the problems of Yugoslavia 
i~self in miniature, and here also religion has been divisive, but in a 
different W<'!Y'· 
The development of nineteenth-century nafionalism in the Balkans 
resulted in pressures ·on the inhabitants of Macedonia to declare for one 
or otl:;ler of the contend.ing nations, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarians obtained an initial advantage. Determined to throw off the 
corrupt and over-weening . influence of the Greek patriarchate in 
Constantinople, and with Russian backing, they persuaded the Ottomans to 
establish an independent Bulgarian exarchate, with an exarch resident in 
Constantinople. The patriarch immediately excommunicated the new exarch 
and his ·;followers, . and a long and frequently bloody struggle followed 
:Qetween the adherents of the exarch and those of the patriarch. 
Bulgarian bishops were appointed and Bulgarian schools establ-ished. The 
Serbs were at a ·disadvantage, since they had no ecclesiastical 
organ·ization · covering Macedonia. They, however, enlisted the support of 
A~stria-Hungary and at the end of the century they had opened a number 
of schools and secured .the bishopric of Skopje for a Serb .. The Greeks 
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also continued to maint~in schools in the area, and great educational 
rivalry sprang up. One c4rious result, noted by a contemporary writer1 
was that boys from the same family might be placed in schools run by 
; 
different nationalities, and since it was a point of honour for a boy to 
adopt the language and nationality of the ssh.ool which had educated him; 
' 
I 
I 
a Greek family might ha,ve a 1 Bulgarian 1 and a 1 Serbian 1 son. Since 
' 
Bulgarian schools greatly: outnumbered the others, census counts showed a 
I 
large but basically ficti~ious Bulgarian majority in the territory. 
I 
Serbia ·finally acquired the greater part of the territory of 
Macedc;mia as a result of the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and set about a 
regime of assimilation, which included the Serbianisation of the 
i 
Macedonian dialects and :the placing of Serbian bishops in Macedonian 
I 
dioceses. Some of them w~re str-Qng Serbian nationalists who in the end 
provoked resentment both among those of the clergy who felt themselves 
Bulgarian and those who shared the growing sense of Macedonian 
nationalism. 
Croatia 
The Croats first emerged as a national unit when Tomis1av, one of 
the tribal chieftains assumed the title of king in about 92~. The Croats 
. .,., 
claim an even longer unbroken link with the papacy going back to 879 
when one·of the local princes, Branimir, received a letter from the pope 
acknowledging his ruie. The boundaries of Croatia fluctuated consider-
ably over the next t.wo centuries of independence; at its gre.atest exte~t· 
it appears to have stretcheq from the Dr~va to the Adriatic,· at one time 
including most of the· Dalmatian coast. It is this kingdom to which 
modern Croatian nationalism harks back. 
At the beginning of the twelfth century Croatia passed by marriage 
to the ruling Hungarian dynasty, thus beginning the long association 
between Croatia and Hungary; at the same time Venice was disputing 
Croat.:i.a 1 s attempts to extend its rule over Dalmatia. The sixteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries saw the incursions of the Ottoman Turks from 
the east and a period of fragmentation and unrest. In the eighteenth 
century the centralising policy of the Habsburgs succeeded in uniting 
Croatia firmly to the empire, with a special relationship to Hungary. 
Meanwhile the Ottomans had conquered Bosnia-Herc~govina and were· a 
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constant thr~at to Croatia ··~n<;l ·the Dal-matian coast. . 
. Th~re' ~Js ! at· this· time no· ··unified :Croat· language and_ several 
different dialects' 'were spoken; ·"the language of the upper .classes was 
• I ' '· .. 
Italian ana priests- -were- almost the only literate p~~ple who German or 
used the Slav : language~- - The- counter~ reformation gave an impe~us to 
education and ~purred -the religi-ous, orders. to . set, up many schools, 
seminaries and- colleges 'where the: true faith could be preserv~d and._ 
taught. It was during the seventeenth- century that tpe Jesuit Ka~'ic 
(Cassia) wrote- a grarninar of the croatia11 language and. chose for its 
basis·- the 'ttokavski dialect: of Bosnia, widely spoken in the hinterland 
of the Adriatic . coast by both Catholics and Orthodox. This dialect thus 
became the basis of-, the· Croatian l-iterary language, .and when in the 
ni~ete~nth .. century Vuk Karaditic chose the similar dialect o:!= :neighbpur-
ing Hercegovina for his Serbian grammar, the basis of a common 
Serb-Croat language was. established. The Catholic Church and the 
Vatican, as opposed to the local clergy, remained rather cautious; th_e 
unique Slav liturgy 'of the Croats, ,known as the glagolitic and written 
in a variant of -·the Cyrillic script, had been banned ever .since the. 
tenth. century and its use was only sanctioned- in a' few places. It is 
worth noting that under the present regime; which during the first two 
decades of its existence was deeply suspicious of the Italia,nising 
influence ·of the 'vatican, e'ricouraged interest in glagoli tic as- part of 
the· Slav inheritance of the· Croat-ian nation. 
In· the eight'eenth and nineteenth centuries two remarkable pr~?lates 
made outstanding contributions to Croat national identity. Bishop 
Vrhovac of Zagreb (1751-1827) · was a romantic nationatist of a kind 
famil'iar in the nineteenth century,- and believed that the church should 
be the guardian and spon·sor· of Croatia '-s national culture;- he_ gave moral 
and financial ·~upport to the few young writers .who were beginning to use 
the vernacular '12mguage. But his -appeal to the" cle'rgy -of the diocese to 
collect folk \ siiyings · and proverbs, · folk -. songs and old books a,nd 
manuscr,tpts 'se-erits·':to have met' with little response and one must c~:mcl_ude 
that in this . asp~ct of. cf-oatiari .riationalis~ he' wa~ before his _time.-
Bishop Josip Juraj 'Strossmayer -of Djakovo (1815-1905) who was an 
early exponent of the idea of the unity of the ·south Slavs, believed 
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I that the deepening of true nationalism, both Croatian and Serbian, and 
true Christ±ari.:lty, both Orthodox and Catholic, would best be achieved 
through education and -culture. At the same time he was a champion of 
Croatian na'-bi6nal rights, hoping to esetablish within the frame~ork of 
the Habsburg.empire an autonomous Croatia which would become the nu~leus 
of ·a south Slav state. He made important contributions to the literary 
and cultural life of the Croats, and founded the Yugoslav Academy of 
Arts and Sciences (note the early · and deliberate use of the word 
Yugoslav: Yug=south) . · In the atmosphere , of nineteenth-century 
Catholicism :he· was· virtually alone in the gestures of friendship which 
he made to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and h~ opposed to the last 
moment the doctrine of papal infallibility at the first Vatican council, 
knowing the' deep off.ence it . wou_Jd give to . the Orthodox. Strossmayer' s 
vision carried him far beyond the parochialism of the average Crop.t 
prelate; _and remains unfulfilled to this day. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 
Religi.on in Bosnia-Herc::::egovina, as in Macedonia·, has beeri a 
divisive·factor. In medieval times the population, tyrannised·.o.ver by an 
undisciplined· nobility, and divided betwee:r; Cathplics in the north and 
·>, 
west" and Orthodox ·in the south and east,, turned in great nurribers. to the 
Bogorilil heresy. This was a dualistic system of belief, similar to that 
of the ·cathars,'and was so fiercely persecuted by both the Catholics and 
the Orthodox that its adherents welcomed the Turks, who promised them 
full. religious toleration. (The evidence is not entirely conclusive, but 
this is currently accepted as the most likely theory:) A majority of the 
population converted to Islam; the feudal lords thu13 retained their 
privileges and the · serfs became free peasants. Those who remained 
Christian became serfs·to .. the Slav Moslem overlords, who adopted the way 
of life and mode . of dress of the Turks, and became more Moslem th~m the 
Ottomans, in m_any cases :rising to the highest positions in the state. 
They late~ resisted fiercely·all the Islamic movements of reform. As the 
Ottoman· empire weakened and was no longer abl~- to control the feudal 
lords·; peasants were g:r;-ound down and dispossessed, and by the eighteenth 
~entury large nurribers had returned to Christianity; the Orthodox Church 
became the largest religious body in this area., 
- 8 -
In the_. thirte~nth pentqry the Franciscans had been invited by the 
ruling Hungarian, duke "j:o ,settle in_ the northern part .of Bosnia; in the 
fift~enth ~en_tury. :_they. received a charter from sultan Mohammed II 
allowing them the free ~xercise of their religion. Tpey also obtained 
papal permission _to act as parish priests;. thi::> privilege which they 
have never reLinquished ha~ been and still is tod<:ty the cause of lasting 
friction with the secular c+ergy and the bishop. 
The Turks for whom religion was . inseparable from nati-onality 
divided their- subjects administratively by religion; all tpe Christlans 
in the territory were put under the jurisdiction oof the Greek patriarch 
in Constantinople. When Austria-Hungary occupied th~ territory in 1878 
I : 
there was an inflpx of Catholic officials from all over the empire; in 
addition a belt of land in the north along the banks of the river Sava 
WqS colonised by Catholics from other parts of the emp,tre, including 
Germans, Poles and .Czechs, th:us adding to the confrontation between 
eastern and western Christianity. _ The Serbian inhabi.tants looked 
increasingly to Serbia for support, revolutionary ·and ter.rorist 
activi-ties sprang. up and culminated in the murder in S9-ra~ev:o of th~ 
qrch~~ke Francis·F~rdinand in 1914. 
Eve~ this . brief al.fd much over-simplified outline makes it clear 
tha~t the seeds of _religious and national tensions were present ·.f:r:om .:the 
begirm,ing in thi.s mosaic of Orthodox and Catholic Christians, Bogomil 
heretics. and Moslem. converts, with power and status divided among them 
in complex-and unexpected ways. 
2 
The nineteenth-century dream of south Slav unity was finally 
fulfilled at _the end . of the first: world war and the break-up of the 
Habsburg empire . when. Yugoslavia. (known at first as the :k.ingdom of the 
Serbs, Cro?ts and Slov"enes) was. established under a_ Serbian dynasty .. The 
Catholic high~r clergy of Croatia, led by arc~bis.hop Bauer of Zagreb, 
were enthusiastic supporters of the union, but it was overshadowed from· 
t~e start by_ a funqamental misund~rstanding: the Croats _looked forward 
to a union of equal peoples and nations,. while the Serbs looked on the 
new stat.e ·simply as a further exte~!;)ion of the kingd?m of Serbia. 
Alth9ugh !3-ll religions._ eQj9Y!?Cl- e_gual .,legal status, th~ _dynasty was 
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Orthodox and advancement in many walks of .life favoured the Orthodox. 
The political history of inter~war Yugoslavia is complex and has no 
place in this paper but during the· 1930s ah episode took place which 
sharpened the tension between the Catholic ··and· the Orthodox Churches and 
inflam~d national feelings patticulariy· among the Orthodox. A concordat · 
.was negotiated between Yugos·lavia and the Vatican to. replace t:he 
concordats which had regula.ted relatioris with the various·. component 
parts of the . n~w state. As soon . as the terms became known patriarch 
Gavrilo protested vigorously at ·-what· the Serbian Orthodox Church 
co~sidered were the special privileges given to the Catholic Church; he 
spoke in the name of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a national 
institution and accused the government of ·betraying the last bulwark of 
Serbianism. Although the goverrunent at once promised that the Orthodox 
and all other religious denominations · would be accorded the same 
privileges· as the Catholic Church the pretext was immediately seized on 
by right-wing opposition Serbian political parties ·to make commo·n cause 
with the Church in an attempt ·to overthrow the government. The Church 
excommunicated the Orthodox members of the g~:>Vernment and all the 
deputies who had voted in favour of the concordat; feeling-9 ran high, a 
. ., . 
religious procession of protest. was attacked by the police and bishops 
. . 
were manhandled. The uproar was so great that the government-backed down 
•.• .... 
and did not proceed to the ratification of ·the ·concordat. The ca·tholic 
'. . 
bishops in ·their turn protested that the government had preached the 
principle of the equality of all faiths but was treating the Serbian 
Orthodox Church as though it was in fact the state church. This episode 
inflamed the antagonism between the Serbs and the Croats which 
bedevilled the political life of Yugoslavia between the two world wars 
and left a residue of hatred among Croat ·extremists which culminated I 
under the Croatian war-time fascist regime, in the brutal murder of two 
Orthodox bishops, the dea·th of a third in a concentration _camp and the 
severe ill-treatment of a· fourth.' 
Yugos·lavia was drawn into· the second world war in April 1941. Under 
. great pressure the government had in. &1arch signed the tripartite pact 
with the Axis; it was immediately overthrown by a popular· coup d I etat 
led by Serbian officers in the army and enthusiastically suppo.rted by 
- 'io -
the patri~rc_h Gavrilo and.· ~is clergy .. Hitler was enraged and early in 
·'· 
April launched. a,n all-ou,t at_t~ck by land a~¢1 air in which Hungarian and 
Bulgarian. for~es joined. ~The campaign la_sted for only eleven days after 
which resistance disintegrated .. Yugoslavia was . parcelled out among the 
Axis pqwerp and their allies Hungary and Bulgaria, and ceased overnight 
. . . . 
to .be a-· state.· The Ustata independent .sta~e of Croatia (which ·included 
Bosnia-Herc;::egoviha, _b11t not . the Dalmatian coast which was annexed by 
Italy, .'to the bitter disillusionment of the Croats) was. set up under 
German and Italian. protection and was welc;:omed enthu~ia:stically by the 
Catholic ·hierarchy in Croatia for national rather. than ideo~ogical 
reasons; the higher ·clergy in Slovenia accepted with . good grace the 
Italian oc;::cupation of ~he southern part of. Slovenia and were then driven 
by circumstances into ever closer collaboration with the German forces 
after the fall of Italy. Serbia was .reduced to 'a small,rump state under 
a. puppet goveri)JIIent, and the patriarch was arrested by the .Germans and 
spent the war in detention and eventually in German concentration camps. 
Macedonia was· annexed by the Bulgarians, who in many cases were 
wel.oomed .·. with.. open arms by those .who still secretly consi¢1.ered 
themselves. B1Jlgarians and resented Serpiafl. domination. The Serbian 
bishops and many of the_ cl~rgy were expelled and fled to Be~grade, the 
Bulgarian bishops and priests were introduced into their pla_ce. But, .as 
an .acute and scholarly observer has written: "the· conduct of the 
Bulgarian occupiers was sufficiently unpleasant to disillusion most of 
the population about the advantages of belonging to Bulgaria, while 
leaving a .large enough sediment of pro-Bulgarian and -anti-Yugoslav 
feelings to make difficulties for Marshal Tito in . p9st-war federal 
Yugoslavia." 2 
The. distrust and suspicion between the Catholic and the .Serbian 
Orthodox Churches of which echoes still persist cannot be understood 
without a knowledge of the past history·, :which I have sketched, but 
.above all without realising the extraord?-nary savagery of th~ _conflict 
between the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Se;r-bs during the war, a · 
savagery which takes one . back to the wars .of. relig.ion in the sixteenth 
century. 
The v Usta-se, wbo governeq tne. ind~pendent state of -Croatia, 
- 11 -
proclaimed their allegiance .to the Catholi'c Church and were determined· 
to eliminate the· Serbs and their churcl). from their territory 1 although 
they were .prepared to accept the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1 since 
they :claimed that the Moslems had originally been Croats. In an episode 
which ·shocked even the German general in command great numbers of 
Orthodox Serbs were either massacred, forcibly converted to Catholicism 
or were deported or fied eastward to what remained of Serbia; the 
structure of the Serbian . Orthodox Church in the new state was destroyed 
and bishops and priests murdered. At least one Catholic bishop in his 
enthusiasm for Croat independence turned a blind eye, others were 
appalled but felt themselves helpless, and archbishop Stepinac of 
' Zagreb, ·leader ·of ·the Catholic hierarchy, who had welcomed the Ustase 
with open arms, protested to tha government with growing anger, but in 
pii va te; later he attacked the ·crimes in a number of sermons. Serbian 
C'e;tnik. ·bands· retaliated savagely wherever· they could ·against both the 
Catholic Croats ·and the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Th~ attitude of the Catholic bishops is a reflection of the close 
ident{fication ·of religion and nationality· among the Croats. and Serbs. 
In prihciple they of course welcomed the prospect of bringing thousands 
. ..., 
bf · sC:hismatics · treely back to their true mother,· the Catholic Church. 
But over the centuries this theological concept had been coloured by 
national and cultural differences. The Croats felt themselves to be 
entirely European, heirs in part of a great Catholic empire, while the 
Serbs belonged to the Byzantine east with its ecclesiastical quarrels 
and schisms. Under the influence of a romantic Slav natio~alism they had 
become united into one· state, which Serbs, as we have seen, tended to 
look upon as simply an extension of Serbia while the Croats chafed 
furiously at what the~ regarded as ·outrageous Serbian hegemonism. 
Suddenly the power of Belgrade was removed and the bishops saw within 
their grasp.the into~icating prospect of a huge influx of converts. to be 
led ·gently back into the fold, ·a precious gift for the 'Holy See (this 
phrase was actu'ally l,lSed) . 
The reports which bishop ·MiS'ic of Mostar (in Hercegovina, where 
some of the worst atrocities took place) was sending to archbishop 
'Stepinac illustrate this further; after describing in detail the reign 
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of terror, 
he added: 
j 
men' are ... cc:tptured like anima~s, they are 
slaughtered . . . living men are thrown off 
cliff~ . . . in a singl~ day 700 scihismatics 
were thrown into their graves . . . six 
carloads of mothers, together with their 
children were· thrown alive off the preci-
pices. . . . (what echoes. of Milton and the 
slaughtered saints!) 
If the Lord had given the authorities more 
understanding to handle the conversions with 
skill and intelligence . . . the number of 
Catholics would have grown by at least, 
500,000/600,000 ... This can serve neither 
the Holy Catholic cause nor· the. (::roatian 
cause . . . we might have emerged into a 
majority in Bosnia-Hercegovina and instead 
of coveting favours fro~ others be able to 
dispense them ourselves. 
The proselytizing activities of the Franciscans seem to have gi'ven a 
particular zeal to their attacks on the Orthodox population. Certainly 
there was justification for the accusation after the war that many 
Ustata leaders and high officials were trained in the Franciscan 
seminaries of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Although archbishop Stepinac protested and made many interventions 
in individual cases, and some of the bishops attempted 'to discipline the 
. . 
parish priests wf.lo collaborated openly with the Ustase and in some cases 
even took part in the slaughter, the attitude of the church and his own 
attitude were sufficiently ambiguous to provide a handle after the war 
to the Communist authorities which they used to good effect not only 
' . 
within the country but internationally. This was only the last event in 
the long history of Catholic-Orthodox conflict in this region which made 
any common Christian solidarity against the Communists after the war 
inconceivable; all Serbs, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, thought that 
archb:(.shop Stepinac had got his just deserts at his trial and were 
angered at what they described as his 'posthumous amnesty' when he was 
buried in 1960 with full honours in the Zagreb cathedra'i. 
When the Communist Partisans took over the government of Yugoslavia 
. . 
at the end of the war, the country, always a poor one, was devastated, 
the populatlon decimated and torn by the passions of the civil war. 
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Aside from the economic. plight of the country one of ·the ·most 
pressing problems facing ·the ,new goverrimen't . was to create a sense 6f 
unity in the country. ·The .[>artisans had· made their revolution under the 
banner of 'brot.herhooq and unity' --bratsvo _:!: jedinstvo--and the unity·· 
was no empty slogan; it was essential if the ·country···was to survive. It 
was Communist Party policy, adopted during the ·war, to give full 
equality to all the constituent nationalities and ·to their .languages 
(there is simultaneous translation today ih the ·federal parliament) and 
it was made an extremely serious offence ·to incite national, racial arid 
religious hatred and intolerance. The ·new const-itution guaranteed 
freedom of religious belief and ·practi9e. This provision was largely 
ignored in the early .years and the churches, especially the Catholic and· 
Orthodox Churches, experienced ·harsh persecution and repression durtng 
the decade after the war. The following decade, ·from the mid-£:lfties ·.to 
tl:J.e mid-sixti,es .was a much quieter time 'for ·the Cat·holic Ch1.1rch i'n 
particular, .·~nd after the m.id-sixties there was a sharp turn towards 
liberalisation. 
But the question of nationalism which the Communists thdught would 
be solved by their enlightened ·policies re·fused .to go away.; ·as soon as 
. . ·>; . 
the .rigidities and intolerance of the early years lightened·, ·nat-ionalist 
sentimer1ts .. reappeared and Croa·tian nationalism, in particular, went so 
much further than the authorities considered safe for the unity of the 
country that in 1972 :t;here. was a sudden reversal of the ··trend ·to 
l;i.beralisation and pluralism and a tig~tening of party discipline 
through the whole system of ''self-management socialism'. The unity o£ 
the country took on a paramount importance, given urgen·cy by t}1e 
realisation that Tito was growing old and his charismatic leadership 
mm;;t sopn disappear. The authorities realised the itnport·ance of 
enlisting the loyalty and support of believers, but were determined t·o 
keep the churc;hes as institutions in their place. Simultaneously the 
churches were gaining confidence; the position of the Catholic Church in 
particular had been tl;'ansformed by the papacy of John XX!II and the 
Second Vatican Council, diplomatic relat~ons had been restored between. 
the Yugoslav government and the Vatican, and president Tito and his wife 
were received by pope Paul VI during an official visit to Rome. 
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The danger which the gov?rnment foresaw was that the churches wou~d 
set themselves up as the embodiment of the nation and its soul, the 
guardians of its 'Serbianism' or 'Croatianism'. Attacks on this subject 
in the secular press began as early as 1969 and during the latter '70s 
became very frequent; they continue unabated today. 
The case of Macedonia is different; here, the concept of a separate 
Macedonian nationalism--for the moment at any rate--draws the Macedon-
ians closer to the Yugoslav federation. At . the ~nd of the war a 
Macedonian republic was established as a constituent member of the 
Yugoslav republic, accompanied by an upsur-ge of joyful nationalist 
sentiment. A national ,language was formed by adopting one of the main 
regional dialects (which already had a literary tradition) and it became 
evident 'that the nationalist ground-swell was accompanied-by a· longing 
for a nation~l church, one of the va~idating marks of a true nation. (It 
is difficult to establish how _far this was a widespread grass-roots 
feeling, or whether it was largely confined to the clergy. Among them, 
it was certainly genuine.) The Serbian bishops had all been expelled in 
1941 and the new government had refused them permission to return. A 
long struggle now began between the Serbian patriarchate in Belgrade, 
f-ighting despera"tely to preserve what it regarded as Serbian unity as 
much as the unity of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Macedonian 
clergy, enthusiastically backed by the Macedonian republican authorities 
who understood that a national church would st~engthen internal 
solidarity and would give Macedonia a useful weapon to resist Bulgarian 
claims that the jnhabitants of the territory were Bulgarian. The 
Macedonian clergy finally won the battle and after nine years of uneasy 
'_autonomy' to which the Serbian patriarchate had reluctantly agreed, 
proclaimed their own autocephaly in 1967. The Serbian Orthodox Church 
considers that the schism has weakened it and undermined its claim to 
represent the whole Serbian nation (since they continue t?. regard the 
-
Macedonians as Serbs) and it is convinced--overtly outside Yugoslavia 
and in Yugoslavia always implicitly--that the Macedonian Orthodox Church 
is simply a creature of the regime. I do not believe that this 
conviction is justified; it seems to me a genuine and historically 
predictable expression of Macedonian nationalism. Its support by the 
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federal government strengthens Macedonia's loyalty to the federation and 
in this sense only can one say that the church is hand in glove with the 
authorities. 
Today the Macedoniari · Orthodox Church is a state church in all but 
name and its archbishop is a· public personality; it receives substantial 
grant·s· of money from the government. It has still not been recognised by 
the ecumenical patriarch or any other Orthodox Church, but it is content 
to wait, remembering that other local Orthodox Churches, the Bulgarian 
and the Greek, for example, had to wait many· decades before their 
independence was recognised. Its greatest danger, a spiritual one, lies 
in the rather suffocating embrace of the,republican authorities. 
We come finally to the Slav Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina, who as 
we have seen, form a distinct ""'Cultural group. In the inter-war years 
they played an important· political role in Yu'gosil.avia and during the war 
their allegiance was divided. Some Moslems joined the Partisans, 
rejecting the claim of ·the Croatian Usta~a stat!= to be. a country of two 
religions, Catholic and' Moslem, but many others, feeling themselves 
Croat rather than Serb gave their allegiance to the Usta'te: After the 
war their ambiguous position continued to cause them une_asiness; many 
..... 
" began to describe themselves ·as Yugoslav by nationality. But the 
Yugoslav ~uthorities very early gave up the attempt to impose an 
over-all Yugoslav national sentiment, recognising that it, was an 
artificial, intellectual concept without ethnic or religious basis, and 
for some years. most Slav Moslems described themselves as either Serbs or 
Croats. Finally the solution was adopted of officially acknowledging the 
existence of a sixth, Moslem, nationality to add to the already existing 
five nations in the federation; the category Moslem had already appeared 
in the 1961 census and in 1968 their separate nationhood was confirmed 
by the governmen·t. This solution was eagerly grasped by a large number 
of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina and was reflected in the. 1971 
census, when ·the number of those describing themselves as 'Yugoslav' 
dropped almost to· vanishing point, the numbers of Serbs and Croats also 
diminished and the number of Moslems rose dramatically. 
The world-wide Islamic revival, added to the resurgence of 
nationalism has given a strong impetus to Slav Moslem feelings of 
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nationality. Religious and secular elements are closely entwined· in 
j 
these feelings and this poses a dilemma for the authorities. It is 
ideologically difficult for them to accept the inescapable religious 
element in Moslem . nationhood. and they have only paJ;"tly succeeded in 
avoiding the problem by stressing the concept of a Moslem culture in 
4 
which religion is only one element. The upsurge of national feeling has 
been accompanied by a religious revival which has touched even Moslem 
intellectuals .. Efforts are being made to raise the educatioDal level of 
the hod~as and a higher theological school 'has been opened to give the 
equivalent of a university degree; a medresa for girls--a revolutionary 
step.for these religiously conservative men-~was also established; Saudi 
Arabia and other Islamic states sent generous financial contributions. 
The Iranian revolution appears also· to have caught the imagfnation of 
some ·of the more extreme elements and Khomeini' s name has appeared in 
slogans scribbled· oh walls. Moslem religiou;3 aJ!d cultural institutions 
are accused of setting themselves up as the only legitimate representa-
t1ves ·of the national identity of Moslems, precisely the same accusation 
which has been made against the catholic ' and Orthodox churches in 
Croatia and Serbia. 
It is too soon to do more than note this latest example of. the 
interaction of religion and national identity in Yugoslavia; but it is 
already clear that the authorities intend to keep it under strict 
control. 
And so, looking back over the complicated intertwining of 
nationalism and religion which I have tried to trace, one might come to 
a rather paradoxical conclusion. Religion which in the beginning 
nurtured a sense of national identity as . one way of resisting 
assimiliation by alien power$ has been overtaken by the growth of 
nationalism and has itself been weakened by the secularisation of 
present-day society; today there can be no doubt · which is the stronger 
-force. It is nationalism which feeds religious feeling, while the 
churches cling desperately to their role as guardians of the so~l of the 
·nation. This has recently been vividly illustrated in Croatia where the 
Catholic Church has been celebrating thirteen-hundred years of Catholi-
cism (dating from the establishment of the first bishopric at Nin in the 
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seventh century) and the eleven-hundredth anniversary of Croatia's 
unbroken link with Rome (dating from the pope's letter to Branimir in 
879), with processions and pilgrimages. It is difficult to see how these 
two historical events are linked in any except a romantic sense to the 
more recent history of the Croats, but t,he Church has attempte9 to. 
transform them into a symbol of the identity of Catholicism with the 
Croatian people. 
Professor Bohdan Bociurkiew of Carlton University, Ontario, who is 
working on a comparative study of church-state relations in East 
European Communist countries, has recentty suggested that scholars 
working in this field tend to give too much emphasis to Marxist-Leninist 
ideology when dealing with the ~ersecution of churches under Communist 
regimes and not enough to political, cultural and social factors, in 
particular nationalism and nationality. He suggests that nationalism.is 
in fact more important than ideology and that everywhere communist 
regimes fear the identification of national feelings with religion and 
the churches. I am convinced that this is particula.rly true of 
Yugoslavia. This is not to deny the strong anti -religious feelings of 
-~;., 
many Yugoslav Communists, particularly among the older generation, some 
of them with little education, who came into the party through the 
war-time Partisans. But this is a dying phenomenon. The present 
generation is secularised, like their contemporaries in the west, and 
those among them who are religious have· often been caught up. in the 
swell of charismatic renewal. The Catholic Church. in particular seems to· 
have perceived this and is beginning to shift its ground from 
natiQnalism to 'human rights'. 
Th('! Yugoslav Communists have reason to fear the disintegrative 
force ·of unfette~ed nationalism, and as long as the churches are 
associated with this, the regime will continue to attack ·them. The 
churches' real challenge tQ Marxist ideology lies elsewhere. 
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